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Abstract. The Supreme Court took an important step 
toward greater protection of private property rights in its 
June, 1992 opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council. Mere recitation by the government of an inten-
tion to protect the public from harm can no longer justify 
or excuse a regulation that renders one's real property 
"valueless". The new "categorical rule" has two exceptions. 
First, such results are allowable if the limitations com· 
plained of are inherent in the title as derived from a 
state's law of property and,second, if the restrictions are 
aimed at activities that constitute public or private nui-
sances. 
BACKGROUND ON LUCAS CASE 
In June, 1992 the U.S. Supreme Court conditionally 
disapproved of the impact of South Carolina's Beachfront 
Management Act (BMA) on the property of a citizen. 
The case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, was 
sent back to the state to allow it an opportunity to demon-
strate that the limitations of the BMA were consistent with 
the new standard announced by the Court. That standard, 
or "new categorical rule" is that " . . . where a state's 
regulations prohibit all economically beneficial use of land, 
compensation must be forthcoming unless the restriction 
made explicit by the regulation inhered in the title itself, 
that is, in the restrictions that background principles of the 
state's law of property and nuisance already place upon 
land ownership." 
This new categorical rule does not prohibit the imposi· 
tion of severe regulatory limitations on uses of private 
property. It does provide that, in particular instances 
where such regulation goes so far as to make it impossible 
to use one's property in an "economically beneficial" way, 
a taking contrary to the 5th Amendment may be found to 
exist. This "new categorical rule" is applicable only in 
cases where a parcel of property is rendered "valueless" by 
government regulatory action. Even the Supreme Court 
admitted that this result is a "rare" and "extraordinary 
circumstance" . 
This standard, on its face, does not jeopardize wetland 
protection regulation such as that presently in force 
pursuant to §404 of the federal Clean Water Act. Howev-
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er, the threat to wetland regulation signalled by the 
decision is raised in statements in the decision by Justice 
Scalia that had no direct bearing on Lucas' land or the 
issues of that particular case. Such gratuitous statements 
in an opinion, called "obiter dicta", often reveal judicial 
attitudes and positions that mature into the "law of the 
case" in future legal opinions. The language that portends 
trouble for wetlands regulations is: "... the rhetorical 
force of our deprivation of all economically feasible use 
rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not 
make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of 
value is to be measured." Thus, although the "relevant 
parcel" question was not asked in Lucas, one can justifi-
ably be concerned about the Court's very apparent attitude 
toward the existing law on the issue as it may impact on 
wetlands protection in the future. 
The attitude revealed by the Court in footnote 7, 
discussed in more detail below, is one of dissatisfaction 
with the way its previous decisions aggregated all elements 
or constituent legal interests comprising the totality of 
one's "property" for the purpose of calcu]ating the degree 
of diminution of value. 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
From a narrow legal point of view, the Lucas decision 
does not present a serious threat to wetland protection or 
to environmental protection regulations generally. As in 
all legal decisions, it is essential to know the "facts of the 
case" and to relate such facts to the Court's pronounce· 
ments. 
The Problem and Remedy 
In 1986, Mr. Lucas bought two half-million dollar lots 
facing on the Atlantic Ocean long before South Carolina 
enacted its Beachfront Management Act in 1988. The 
BMA's purpose and approach was to protect the naturally 
functioning "sand-sharing" system along its coastline by 
prohibiting human activities that interfere with the cyclic 
movement of sediments onto and off the shorelands and 
shallow seas near the coast. Lucas' land was in a subdivi-
sion where other owners had previously built residences on 
ooth sides of the lots in question. 
The BMA required the Olastal Oluncil to establish 
"baselines" paralleling the shoreline that represented the 
"landward-most points of erosion ... during the past 40 
years" and prohibited construction of occupiable improve-
ments seaward of a set-back line "20 feet landward of, and 
parallel to, the baseline". Thus, Mr. Lucas simply could 
not build houses on his lots. 
Conclusive labels of the Past 
The South Carolina legislature cited numerous "rea-
sons" for the passage of the BMA that can be character-
ized as either "harm-preventing" or "benefit-conferring". 
The significance of the distinction between these two 
regulatory justifications is that courts have almost routinely 
upheld government infringements on property rights that 
were reasonably characterized as the former but have 
required payment of compensation in circumstances of the 
latter. 
Trial Court Supports Property Owner 
Mr. Lucas filed suit against the State claiming that his 
land had been "taken" in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Olnstitution, and the local trial court 
judge agreed with him. The trial court said that the 
"prohibition [on Lucas' use of his lots] deprived Lucas of 
any reasonable economic use of the lots, eliminated the 
unrestricted right of use, and rendered them valueless." 
South Carolina did not contest this conclusion of fact in 
the State Supreme Olurt and accordingly was not allowed 
to raise it in the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, Justice 
Souter urged the Court to not rule on Mr. Lucas' claims 
until the case could be sent back for better investigation 
by the State of the issue of the extent to which the value 
of his property had been diminished. A conclusion that 
the degree of deprivation is less than total could result in 
the removal of Lucas' case from protection under the "new 
categorical rule". 
Justice Blackmun Dissents 
Justice Blackmun did not agree with the majority 
opinion and, in his dissent, focused on the physical 
attributes of Lucas' lots - apparently to make the point 
that it was never a reasonable expectation that the lots 
could have been used for construction of residences. He 
noted that for approximately one-half of the last 40 years, 
all or part of the lots were "part of the beach or [were] 
flooded twice daily by the ebb and flow of the tide." Thus, 
according to Justice Blackmun, "reasonable investment-
backed expectations" were absent. The preceding phrase 
is legalese for the proposition that persons can not sue the 
government for "takings" damages for frustrating their 
plans when those plans do not meet some objective 
standard of reasonableness. 
REVERSAL IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
"Harm" and "Benefit" Standards Rejected 
In announcing the new "categorical rule", quoted 
aoove, the Supreme Court rejected a long history of 
judicial toleration of government regulation that was 
purportedly intended to "prevent harm" to the public 
arising from the maintenance of "noxious uses" of proper-
ty. The South Carolina Supreme Court had upheld 
application of the BMA to Lucas' lots on the basis of that 
supposed line of precedent. The Supreme Court said the 
standards of "harm-prevention" and "benefit-conferring" 
were too subjective in that they were vulnerable to the 
variabilities of individual observers. Then, in the second 
part of the categorical rule, the Court specified the type of 
harm prevention that will pass the new constitutional test. 
Such limitations, i.e., "harm-preventing", must be of the 
sort that are already constitutionally subject to regulation 
for being in violation of principles of common law - such 
as private and public nuisances. 
Reinvigoration of Nuisance Principles 
The "common law" is that oody or collection of 
principles, rules, and standards that evolved over many 
years via court pronouncements in countless litigations 
beginning in England and later continuing in the U.S. 
Generally, a nuisance is an activity or condition carried 
out or maintained on one's property that unreasonably 
interferes with correlative rights of others on their proper-
ty or with the similar rights of the public collectively. 
Thus, when the government proscribes an activity on 
private property, it must be able to demonstrate that, 
under the common law, private neighooring landowners, 
citizens, or the government on behalf of the public could 
also stop the activity under the respective nuisance 
principles. Part of the rationale for this conclusion is that 
no landowner can logically or legally expect to be able to 
create or maintain activities that interfere with others' use 
of their land. Thus, the government will be doing no more 
by regulatory edict than has always been legally possible 
under the common law - a source of property rights limita-
tion under which all landowners are presumed to hold 
their land. After expressing doubt that South Carolina 
could conform its treatment of Mr. Lucas' land to the new 
categorical rule, the Court sent the case back to the 
Coastal Council for an opportunity to attempt to do so. 
THE HIDDEN THREAT SIGNALLED IN LUCAS 
"Obiter Dictum": The Significant Lucas Legacy 
The primary "law of the case" of Lucas, i.e., regula-
tions that render property valueless require compensation 
to the landowner, does not, by itself, threaten environmen-
tal protective measures. However, Justice Scalia discussed 
his concern aoout another aspect of the "taking" issue that 
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signals trouble for government property use limitations 
such as wetland preservation regulations like those 
imposed by §404 of the Oean Water Act. In introducing 
his concern, Justice Scalia said, "[r]egrettably, the rhetori-
cal force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible 
use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does 
not make clear the 'property interest' against which the 
loss of value is to be measured". 
What is the Relevant "Parcel"? 
This inquiry into what is the "relevant parcel" of 
property for takings analysis is best explained by an 
illustration based on circumstances that occur often in the 
present regulatory context of wetlands and endangered 
species protection. Farmer A has 1,000 acres of timber 
including 35 acres of forested wetland and a population of 
red cockaded woodpeckers, a listed endangered species, 
that inhabit a 25-acre stand of mature pines. Farmer A 
has been denied a permit to fill the wetJand portion of his 
land, and he has been threatened with prosecution if he 
harvests the timber in which the woodpeckers nest. 
Existing Supreme Court precedent will allow these partial 
deprivations of Farmer A's rights because such limitations 
affect only 60 acres of the whole tract or 6 percent. In 
other words, when the extent or seriousness of the govern-
ment's infringement on private property rights is evaluat-
ed, the Court will look at the whole tract in its balancing 
calculation. Thus, a high percentage of the value of the 60 
acres to Farmer A could be "taken" via regulation because, 
compared to his entire property, the restricted portions are 
a relatively small part. 
A New "Deprivation Fraction" 
In a footnote in the Lucas case, Justice Scalia and the 
other justices of the majority clearly signalled their 
disapproval of this "composition of the denominator in 
[the] 'deprivation' fraction" that leads to a decision as to 
whether a particular limitation on private property has 
become so severe as to require compensation to the 
owner. There is little doubt that, given a proper set of 
facts in the future, the majority will explicitly change the 
"composition of the 'deprivation' fraction" so as to use as 
the denominator the parcel or part of a tract that is 
peculiarly affected by the use-limiting regulation. 
In the hypothetical above, this very probable future 
change will result in a taking evaluation that is focused on 
the 35-acre wetland and the 25-acre woodpecker nesting 
area as separate property interests and not merely as a 
relatively small part of the whole 1,OOO-acre tract. The 
denominators will be "35" and "25" respectively, not 
"1,000". Thus, the inquiry will measure how severely 
Farmer A's rights in the wetland and nesting area are 
limited by the regulations, and a "taking" will certainly be 
found if the partial tracts are rendered "valueless" - as in 
Lucas and if the interests thus limited constitute a distinct, 
recognizable property interest under state law. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The law governing the extent to which government 
may limit the use of private land in pursuit of its environ-
mental protection goals without running afoul of the con-
stitutional prohibitions on taking property without com-
pensation are bound to change in the near future. If 
Justice Scalia's comments in the footnotes of Lucas reflect 
the probable outcome in a proper case in the future, gov-
ernments will have to be much more careful to construct 
a logically and scientifically valid rationale that relates 
restrictions imposed on private property to common Jaw 
nuisance prevention or abatement standards. 
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